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Monday 5 October 1981

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POLAND: Moderates Gain Time	
The compromise resolution on workers' self-management endorsed by Solidarity's congress is a tactical victory for union moderates that allows time for further negotiation of differences between the government and the union. 25X1	
There apparently was little support for a militant proposal flatly rejecting the law, which was passed by parliament on 25 September. Instead, the delegates directed the new union leadership to organize a referendum on objectionable parts of the law in what seems to be an effort to bring about amendments or to ensure implementation on favorable terms.	
Solidarity leaders evidently will have some latitude in carrying out this directive; no deadline for a referendum was set. They also can use the threat of the referendum to bring pressure on the regime as the two sides negotiate the vague areas of the legislation especially the issue regarding which directors will be chosen by workers' councils.	1
The government's announcement of price increases for a small number of consumer goodseffective todayhas angered many delegates and prompted Solidarity leader Lech Walesa to send a telegram to Premier Jaruzelski demanding their recision. In a conciliatory gesture to the newly reelected union leader, Jaruzelski quickly dispatched two ministers to Gdansk to consult with Solidarity. The ministers' justifications for the price hikes were rejected during a heated session, and Walesa again demanded recision of the price hikes.	1
The Solidarity leadership is interpreting a recent letter from the head of the Hungarian trade union organization offering to "discuss and debate" the role of unions as a hopeful sign that Solidarity can find some common ground with other East European unions. The Hungarian message—which declined Solidarity's invitation to its congress because of its "antisocialist, anti—Soviet" platform—is the first offer of a dialogue by any regime—controlled trade union in Eastern Europe. Hungarian motives are unclear—the message may be nothing more than rhetoric—but the action presumably will not please 25X1 Moscow.	
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Moscow has not initiated any significations in its public commentary on the condays, although it is sustaining its critical Soviets are keeping pressure on Warsaw by calls for firmer government action from expolish party and populace. They are contextremists in the Solidarity leadership pointing to "positive" voices being raise at Gdansk.	agress in recal line. To citing conclements in cinuing to a but are al	cent The tinued the ttack so
The Soviets have reported, but not of Walesa's reelection. Unless some particutive anti-Soviet statements are made at Gis likely to withhold a more definitive its future course until after the congresently will continue at least until tomore	larly provo dansk, Mosc ndication o s, which ap	ca- ow f

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YUGOSLAVIA: Leadership Changes The resignation from the party profession of a longtime Tito confident is the moleadership change since Tito's death at the door to similar personnel changes Stambolic resigned on Thursday, the leadership changes on the case of the case o	ost significant and probably opens Before Petar eadership had been presidium that sone of only three in both the top acement suggests o's Fadilj Hodza ay end soon. Kovic, head of poolic tends to	25X1
ship. Markovic has been in the lead to increase its authority over the troince; he has been at odds with another Minic, who believes such efforts risk nationalism. Minic, however, has no base in Serbia and is not likely to fif for his more moderate views.	in Serbia's drive oubled Kosovo Prov- r Serb leader, Milos inflaming Serb independent power	25X1
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
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